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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Schuylkill Energy Resources, Inc., ("SER") filed this 
antitrust action against Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. 
("PP&L") for allegedly monopolizing and attempting to 
monopolize the provision of electric energy to retail 
consumers within PP&L's service area and to wholesale 
resellers affiliated with PP&L. SER contends that PP&L 
impermissibly curtailed purchases of SER-generated 
electric energy and that SER was therefore unable to 
compete with PP&L in the provision of electric energy to 
consumers in the retail market and resellers in the 
wholesale market. 
 
The district court granted PP&L's motion to dismiss 
SER's antitrust claims for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over SER's pendent state law 
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claims. We must decide whether SER has adequately pled 
antitrust injury. We find that by agreement and by law, 
SER is PP&L's supplier, not PP&L's competitor, and that 
PP&L's generation curtailment policy does not create an 
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to 
prevent. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
Under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 791a et seq., 
any person who owns or operates facilities used to transmit 
or sell electric energy in interstate commerce is subject to 
the jurisdiction and regulatory power of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission ("FERC"). 16 U.S.C. § 824. In 1978, 
Congress amended the Federal Power Act by passing the 
Public Utility Regulatory Practices Act of 1978 ("PURPA"). 
Congress passed PURPA to encourage the development of 
alternative energy sources in an effort to reduce United 
States' dependence on foreign oil. Congress believed that 
the development of alternative energy sources was impeded 
by the reluctance of traditional electric utilities to purchase 
energy from and sell energy to non-traditional facilities as 
well as by the substantial financial burdens imposed on 
non-traditional facilities by pervasive federal and state 
regulation. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750-51, 
102 S.Ct. 2126, 2132-33 (1982) (citing legislative history of 
PURPA). 
 
To further this goal, PURPA requires electric utilities to 
purchase electric energy produced by independent power 
producers operating so-called "qualifying cogeneration 
facilities." See 16 U.S.C. §§ 796(18)(B), 824a-3. Congress 
directed FERC to promulgate rules and regulations 
governing the terms of such purchases and sales, and state 
agencies such as the Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission ("PUC") are empowered to regulate the facilities 
and approve the contracts covered by PURPA. See 16 
U.S.C. § 824a-3(f); 18 C.F.R. pt. 292.1 
_______________________________________________1__________________ 
 
1. The PUC is an independent state administrative commission 
authorized to regulate public utility companies doing business in 
Pennsylvania. See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 301, 501. The Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Code provides the PUC with broad authority to "supervise 
and regulate" public utilities doing business in Pennsylvania. Id. 
§ 501(b). PUC regulations, like their FERC counterpart, require utilities 
to purchase energy from "qualifying facilities." 52 Pa. Code § 57.34. 
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II.2 
 
SER is an independent power producer that owns and 
operates an anthracite coal refuse-fired cogeneration plant 
in Shenandoah, Pennsylvania. The plant is a qualifying 
facility under PURPA, the Federal Power Act, and PUC 
regulations. See 16 U.S.C. § 796(18); 18 C.F.R. pt. 292; 52 
Pa. Code § 57.31.3 
 
PP&L is an electric utility chiefly reliant on coal-burning 
and nuclear power sources. PP&L services Allentown, 
Pennsylvania, and surrounding areas. PP&L is regulated by 
the PUC. PP&L is a member of the Pennsylvania-New 
Jersey-Maryland Interconnection ("PJM"), a power pool 
maintained by an unincorporated association of 
approximately eight member electric utilities located in 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware and 
Washington, D.C. PJM member companies sell excess 
electric generation capacity to PJM, which is then sold to 
other PJM member companies or to other power pools. 
 
Pursuant to the regulations promulgated by FERC under 
the authority of PURPA, PP&L is required to purchase 
electric energy from SER.4 On October 17, 1986, SER and 
PP&L entered into a twenty-year Power Purchasing 
Agreement. Under the terms of the Agreement, "SER is 
required to sell exclusively to PP&L, and PP&L is required 
to purchase SER's entire net power output up to 79.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, we must accept as true the factual 
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from them. Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 201 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 
3. SER asserts that it is both an independent power producer and a 
qualifying facility. We note, however, that an "independent power 
producer" is by definition "[a]n electric power supplier which is not a 
qualifying facility . . . ." 52 Pa. Code § 57.31. This potential conflict is not 
relevant for the purposes of this appeal, however, and throughout this 
opinion we will refer to SER as both an independent power producer and 
a qualifying facility without deciding whether either designation is 
inappropriate. 
 
4. PP&L is also required to (and does) purchase electric energy from 
independent power producers other than SER. 
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megawatts at a price per kilowatt hour which is either fixed 
within the agreement or calculated as a percentage of 
PP&L's Energy-Only Avoided Cost." Amended Complaint, 
¶ 22. PP&L is permitted to purchase less than SER's total 
electric energy output "only when curtailed purchases are 
necessary for PP&L `to make repairs, changes, tests or 
inspections, or for reasons of an actual or potential System 
Emergency, Forced Outage, Force Majeure or PP&L System 
operating condition which necessitates such disconnections 
or curtailments . . . .' " Amended Complaint, ¶ 31 (quoting 
Agreement, Art. 9, ¶ E). PP&L may not curtail purchases of 
SER's electric output " `for reasons of economic dispatch.' " 
Amended Complaint, ¶ 42 (quoting Agreement, Art. 9, ¶ E). 
 
The Agreement defines "system emergency" as "any 
condition on the PP&L System or PJM System which, in 
PP&L's opinion, may disrupt service to customers or 
endanger life or property." Amended Complaint, ¶ 32 
(quoting Agreement, Art. 1, ¶ CC). According to SER, PP&L 
has improperly construed the term "system emergency" to 
include "minimum generation emergencies" and "minimum 
generation events" (collectively "MINGENS") identified by 
PJM. MINGENS occur when the aggregate power demand 
within the regions serviced by PJM is expected to fall below 
its normal or emergency minimum generation floor level 
and PJM cannot sell the pool's excess power to the other 
pools or reduce PJM member company purchases. 
 
SER alleges that when MINGENS are issued by PJM, 
PP&L has a policy of reducing purchases of energy from 
independent power producers with high energy prices first 
and cutting purchases from PP&L-owned energy producers 
less severely. SER alleges that the majority of PP&L's 
declarations of system emergencies are disingenuous and 
are actually declared for reasons of "economic dispatch." In 
other words, when total electric power available for 
distribution by PJM exceeds aggregate customer demand, 
PP&L disproportionately curtails the purchase of electric 
energy generated by SER and other independent power 
producers. 
 
SER complains that when PP&L curtails purchases of 
energy from SER (as it has on several occasions), SER is 
unable to satisfy its own parasitic load requirements and 
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must purchase oil and electricity. SEC also alleges that 
PP&L's generation curtailments have caused it to lose 
revenues and to incur other incidental costs. 
 
III. 
 
In its Amended Complaint, SER alleges two separate 
federal antitrust violations by PP&L under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. In Count I, SER alleges a claim 
of monopolization. In Count II, SER alleges a claim of 
attempt to monopolize. SER also alleges related state-law 
claims for intentional misrepresentation, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of duty 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
 
On November 2, 1995, PP&L moved pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Amended Complaint in its 
entirety. In the alternative, PP&L sought to have the district 
court stay the federal proceeding and refer the case on 
primary jurisdiction grounds to the PUC for an 
administrative proceeding to determine the regulatory 
propriety of PP&L's generation curtailment policies. On 
January 23, 1996, the district court invoked the doctrine of 
primary jurisdiction, entered a stay order suspending all 
further proceedings pending the outcome of the anticipated 
PUC proceeding, and denied without prejudice PP&L's 
motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. 
 
On February 2, 1996, SER filed a motion for 
reconsideration of the stay order. On April 15, 1996, the 
district court heard oral argument on both SER's motion for 
reconsideration and the merits of PP&L's motion to dismiss 
the Amended Complaint. The court directed the parties to 
file letter briefs on these motions. In its April 19, 1996, 
letter brief, SER included two footnotes in which it 
requested an opportunity to amend its Amended Complaint 
in lieu of dismissal. SER never filed a formal motion to 
amend its Amended Complaint. 
 
On May 21, 1996, the district court granted PP&L's 
motion to dismiss SER's Amended Complaint in its entirety. 
After dismissing SER's federal antitrust claims, the district 
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
SER's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 
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The court dismissed as moot SER's motion to lift the stay 
order. SER filed this timely appeal. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.5 
 
IV. 
 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to 
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 
To state a claim for monopolization, a plaintiff must 
allege "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of 
that power as distinguished from growth or development as 
a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historical accident." Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 
Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 197 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71, 86 S.Ct. 
1698, 1704 (1966)). To state a claim for attempted 
monopolization, a plaintiff must allege "(1) that the 
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive 
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power." 
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456, 113 
S.Ct. 884, 890-91 (1993); see also Barr Lab., Inc. v. Abbott 
Lab., 978 F.2d 98, 112 (3d Cir. 1992) (plaintiff must allege 
that defendant "(1) had specific intent to monopolize the 
relevant market, (2) engaged in anti-competitive or 
exclusionary conduct, and (3) possessed sufficient market 
power to come dangerously close to success."). 
 
SER's right to maintain a private cause of action for 
damages arising under Section 2 of the Sherman Actflows 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of PP&L's 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 
272, 277 (3d Cir. 1996). We apply the same standard as the district 
court; that is, we must "refrain from granting a dismissal unless it is 
certain that no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could 
be proved." Fuentes, 946 F.2d at 201. 
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from Section 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides for suits 
by "any person who shall be injured in his business or 
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws." 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl- 
O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690 (1977), the 
Supreme Court limited the class of Section 4 plaintiffs to 
those who plead and prove "antitrust injury." Observing 
that the antitrust laws were designed for the "protection of 
competition, not competitors," the Court stated: 
 
[P]laintiffs . . . must prove more than injury causally 
linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs 
must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of 
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent 
and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts 
unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive 
effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts 
made possible by the violation. 
 
Id. at 489, 97 S.Ct. at 697 (emphasis in original); see also 
Brader v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 64 F.3d 869, 875 (3d Cir. 
1995); International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. 
Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 1327-28 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
SER alleges that PP&L's curtailment of energy purchases 
from SER and other independent power producers harms 
competition and consumer welfare 
 
by keeping PP&L's rate base artificially high, by 
depriving consumers within PP&L's service area of 
energy sources other than those owned and/or 
exploited by PP&L (which, in turn, reduces the 
reliability of electric service provided), and by reducing 
the availability to consumers of power produced using 
alternative, environmentally pro-active energy sources. 
 
Amended Complaint, ¶ 66.6 We address each of these 
alleged injuries in turn. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. SER also alleged a list of its damages, including the loss of electricity 
sales revenues, increased costs to purchase fuel oil and electricity, and 
accelerated depreciation of the plant through increased stress upon vital 
components attributable to excessive cycling. Amended Complaint, ¶ 70. 
These allegations do not constitute antitrust injury. As the district court 
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We begin with SER's allegation that PP&L's generation 
curtailment policy enables PP&L to keep its rate base 
artificially high. SER contends that PP&L's rate base is a 
function of the value of "used and useful" capital equipment 
owned by PP&L for generating, transmitting and 
distributing electricity to the public. PP&L may not, 
however, include the cost of electrical power purchased 
from independent power producers like SER in PP&L's rate 
base.7 According to SER, during periods of lower demand, 
PP&L has an economic incentive to maintain power 
generation at its own facilities (to preserve a high rate base) 
and to reduce energy purchases from independent power 
producers, which cost PP&L money but contribute nothing 
to PP&L's rate base. 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, whether and to 
what extent PP&L maintains an artificially high rate base is 
not within the purview of the antitrust laws. As SER 
concedes, Pennsylvania regulators -- not the market -- 
determine PP&L's rate base. PP&L has no unilateral ability 
to change its rates; any increase or decrease in rates must 
be filed with the PUC and conform to PUC regulations and 
orders. See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. #8E8E # 1301, 1308; Yeager's 
Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 22 F.3d 1260, 
1270 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Pennsylvania statutes expressly 
provide for PUC regulation of rates . . . ."). 
 
PP&L contends that "[t]he antitrust laws are intended to 
protect the competitive process by which prices and other 
terms of trade are established by the marketplace, not how 
regulators administer the accounting formulas that [are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
properly concluded, "[s]uch injuries to an individual competitor 
company, without allegations of injury to competition or consumer 
welfare, are insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of 
federal antitrust law." Dist. Ct. Op., at 7, 1996 WL 284994, at *3 (E.D. 
Pa. May 21, 1996); see Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488, 97 S.Ct. at 697. 
 
7. "Utilities earn a return only on their property which is used and useful 
in producing and delivering power. The utilities earn no return on costs, 
such as those incurred to purchase fuel or power from other sources 
such as [qualifying facilities]." Lehigh Valley Power Comm. v. 
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 563 A.2d 548, 552 n.10 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1989). 
 
                                9 
used in] ratemaking." Appellee Brief, at 20. We agree. SER's 
complaints about PP&L's allegedly high rate base should be 
brought before the PUC, not to federal court on an antitrust 
complaint.8 
 
SER also alleges that PP&L's curtailment of energy 
purchases from SER and other independent power 
producers "depriv[es] consumers within PP&L's service area 
of energy sources other than those owned and/or exploited 
by PP&L." Amended Complaint, ¶ 66. Depriving consumers 
of "energy sources" is not, however, cognizable antitrust 
injury. An "energy source" is not the same as a 
"competitor," and the fact that PP&L obtains the majority of 
its energy from few energy sources does not indicate an 
absence of competition. For example, if PP&L were to "own 
and/or exploit" a diverse supply of energy sources, thus 
satisfying SER's expressed concern, the relevant question of 
whether PP&L was unlawfully monopolizing the relevant 
market would remain unanswered. Consumers within 
PP&L's service area would still receive the same product 
(electricity) and the same amount of competition (none). At 
issue is whether PP&L unlawfully excluded independent 
power producers like SER from the relevant market, not 
whether consumers receive electricity generated by nuclear, 
coal, culm, solar, or any other energy source.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In Pennsylvania, the PUC has been entrusted with "full power and 
authority . . . to enforce, execute and carry out, by its regulations, 
orders, or otherwise, . . . the provisions of [the Code] and the full intent 
thereof." 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 501; see id. § 1301 (rates shall be 
"just and reasonable"). 
 
SER's assertion that PP&L's curtailments allow it to"unfairly and 
illegally skew the evidence, concerning the extent to which its capital 
equipment is utilized that it presents the PUC in support of rate 
requests, thereby misleading the PUC in its rate determinations," 
Appellant Brief, at 18-19, might also appropriately be grounds for a 
complaint before the PUC, but it is not a basis for an antitrust 
complaint. See 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1311 (PUC may ascertain and 
fix fair value of public utility's property); id. §§ 505, 1302 (public utilities 
shall furnish information to PUC). 
 
9. In addition, while the environmental quality of energy sources may be 
a worthwhile concern, it does not appear to be a problem whose solution 
is found in the Sherman Act. See, e.g., In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air 
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Even if we construe SER's Amended Complaint to find an 
assertion that PP&L's generation curtailment policy 
destroys competition in the provision of energy to 
consumers, we would still not find any cognizable antitrust 
claim in this case. To state a claim for monopolization, SER 
must allege, inter alia, that PP&L willfully acquired or 
maintained monopoly power in the relevant market. To 
state a claim for attempted monopolization, SER must 
allege, inter alia, that PP&L had a dangerous probability of 
achieving monopoly power in the relevant market. For both 
claims, we must consider the scope of the relevant market. 
Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456-59, 113 S.Ct. at 891-92. 
According to SER, the primary relevant market in this case 
is the retail service of 1.2 million customers in PP&L's 
service area, which covers approximately 10,000 square 
miles of central eastern Pennsylvania. Amended Complaint, 
¶ 16. 
 
Thus, SER must allege that PP&L unlawfully acquired 
monopoly power or had a dangerous probability of 
unlawfully achieving monopoly power in its service area. To 
do this, SER must allege that PP&L in some way acted to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pollution, 538 F.2d 231, 236 (9th Cir. 1976) (where "the harm to be 
alleviated is environmental, not economic in the antitrust sense," court 
affirmed dismissal of antitrust suit); Conservation Council of W. Austl., 
Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp. 270, 281 (W.D. Pa. 1981) 
(where plaintiff "attempt[s] to raise environmental issues under the guise 
of antitrust laws," court dismissed plaintiff 's complaint for failure to 
state claim upon which relief can be granted); see also Gutierrez v. E. & 
J. Gallo Winery Co., Inc., 604 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming 
dismissal of antitrust claims brought by farm workers complaining about 
work reduction; plaintiffs' goals were unrelated to purpose of antitrust 
laws); Marchwinski v. Oliver Tyrone Corp., 83 F.R.D. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1979) 
(dismissing antitrust claims that sought to remedy gender 
discrimination); cf. National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 
U.S. 679, 693-95, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1366-67 (1978) (rejecting defendant's 
attempt to use safety and health to justify anticompetitive behavior). 
 
We do not decide that environmental quality can never be considered 
when conducting antitrust analysis. Rather, we conclude that when an 
antitrust defendant's conduct cannot be linked to antitrust injury, the 
fact that the conduct may be otherwise undesirable is not a concern of 
the antitrust laws. 
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exclude SER as a competitor in the delivery of electricity to 
customers in PP&L's service area. In Vinci v. Waste 
Management, Inc., 80 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained: 
 
The antitrust laws are intended to preserve competition 
for the benefit of consumers in the market in which 
competition occurs. . . . The requirement that the 
alleged injury be related to anti-competitive behavior 
requires, as a corollary, that the injured party be a 
participant in the same market as the alleged 
malefactors. . . . A plaintiff who is neither a competitor 
nor a consumer in the relevant market does not suffer 
antitrust injury. 
 
Id. at 1376 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see 
also International Raw Materials, 978 F.2d at 1328. SER 
attempts to satisfy its pleading obligation by contending 
that it is PP&L's competitor in the retail market: 
 
PP&L gets reimbursed dollar for dollar from its 
customers . . . for all power which it purchases from 
SER . . . . Therefore, SER, to all intents and purposes, 
is selling its power to the public with PP&L acting as a 
distribution agent or middleman. . . . SER, therefore, is 
a competitor with PP&L for the sale of electric energy to 
PP&L's consumers within PP&L's service area. 
 
Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 24-25. According to SER, PP&L's 
generation curtailment policy harms SER, and thus harms 
competition. We do not agree. SER is not PP&L's competitor 
-- it is PP&L's supplier. SER concedes that in October 
1986, it entered into an agreement with PP&L in which 
"SER is required to sell [its electric energy] exclusively to 
PP&L" for twenty years. Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 20, 22. 
Pursuant to the Agreement which SER now seeks to 
enforce, SER is currently prohibited from competing with 
PP&L in the relevant market. A supplier of a product does 
not become a competitor of the purchaser merely because 
the purchaser in turn sells the product to the ultimate 
user. SER cannot allege that PP&L's purported breach of 
contract establishes injury to competition when that very 
contract prevents SER from competing with PP&L in the 
first place. 
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In addition to the fact that the Agreement on its face 
defeats SER's claim that it is PP&L's competitor, state and 
federal laws prohibit SER from competing in the relevant 
market. SER concedes that independent power producers 
such as SER "normally cannot, by virtue of state and 
federal regulation and physical limitations, sell power 
directly to consumers." Amended Complaint, ¶ 12. SER 
does not allege that it is currently permitted to sell 
electricity directly to consumers, and SER concedes that 
"SER did not, at the time the complaint was drafted, have 
the ability to deliver environmentally friendly energy directly 
to retail consumers." Oral Arg. Trans. at 5. 10 
 
SER directs our attention to the Pennsylvania Electricity 
Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act, 66 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2801 et seq., which was signed into law 
on December 3, 1996. The Choice and Competition Act will 
fundamentally restructure Pennsylvania's retail electric 
industry by providing consumers with a choice of electric 
generation suppliers. The Act will permit competition in 
PP&L's service area. 
 
The Choice and Competition Act comes too late for SER's 
Amended Complaint. Competitive retail access will be 
phased in over time, and direct access to competition will 
not exist across Pennsylvania until January 1, 2001. 
Competitive retail access pilot programs did not begin until 
April 1, 1997, id. § 2804(12), long after SER filed its 
Amended Complaint, and the pilot programs are only 
available to five percent of the "peak load." Id. § 2806(B).11 
 
SER asks us to find that PP&L's generation curtailment 
policy injures SER today, and that those injuries will inhibit 
SER's ability to compete with PP&L in the future market. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. See also Greensboro Lumber Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 643 F. Supp. 
1345, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 1986) ("In establishing PURPA, . . . Congress did 
not intend to place qualifying facilities in competition with public 
utilities. . . . Qualifying facilities are not authorized under PURPA to sell 
at retail . . . . [T]hey are not competitors of public utilities."), aff'd, 844 
F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 
11. At oral argument, counsel for SER conceded that "the first 
opportunity for customers to choose their electric generation suppliers is 
April 1st of this year . . . ." Oral Arg. Trans. at 13. 
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We cannot permit SER to pursue such a speculative path 
to recovery under the Sherman Act. 
 
We will not attempt to predict the future of competitive 
retail access in Pennsylvania. We do not know whether SER 
or PP&L will even exist in 2001, and we certainly do not 
know whether PP&L will enjoy an unlawful monopoly in its 
service area at that time.12 What we do know is that SER is 
presently unable to compete with PP&L, both by agreement 
and by law. While SER attempts to characterize itself as 
PP&L's competitor on the eve of deregulation, we conclude 
that SER cannot, as a matter of law, establish that PP&L's 
generation curtailment policy creates an injury of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.13 
 
As noted, we read SER's Amended Complaint to address 
primarily SER's intention to compete with PP&L in the 
retail market -- the 1.2 million customers within PP&L's 
service area. SER also contends, however, that it is PP&L's 
competitor for the wholesale distribution of power to PJM 
member companies and other power pools. Amended 
Complaint, ¶ 37.14 According to the Amended Complaint, 
however, the Power Purchase Agreement requires SER to 
sell its energy exclusively to PP&L. SER is therefore 
contractually prohibited from selling energy to wholesale 
resellers other than PP&L. We cannot conceive how SER 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. At oral argument, counsel for SER conceded that "it's true that we 
don't know exactly what the market will look like[following deregulation] 
. . . ." Oral Arg. Trans. at 16. 
 
13. We do not decide whether PP&L's generation curtailment policy 
would violate the Sherman Act in a competitive market where no 
agreement precluded competitive activity. That scenario, while it may 
arise at some point in the future, is not presently before us. 
 
14. At oral argument, counsel for SER suggested that the relevant 
"wholesale market" includes sales to industrial consumers who attach 
transmission lines to SER's line. Oral Arg. Trans. at 25. We disagree. The 
"sale of electric energy at wholesale" is defined by statute as the "sale of 
electric energy to any person for resale." 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (emphasis 
supplied). Industrial consumers who purchase electric energy for their 
own use (i.e., not for resale), are not wholesale customers; they are retail 
consumers. The relevant wholesale market in this case, as suggested in 
SER's Amended Complaint, is the sale of energy to PJM member 
companies and other power pools. 
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intends to compete with PP&L in the wholesale market 
without violating the very agreement which it seeks to 
enforce here.15 
 
In addition, SER's failure to obtain FERC approval 
precludes it from compelling other PJM member companies 
to accept energy directly from SER in the wholesale market 
as a matter of law. Before PJM member companies may be 
compelled to accept energy directly from SER: (1) SER must 
file an application with FERC; (2) affected State 
commissions and utilities must receive notice; (3) there 
must be an opportunity for a hearing; and (4) FERC must 
find that such action is necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b); 18 C.F.R. pt. 32. In 
addition, FERC may not compel the enlargement of 
generating facilities for such purposes, and it may not 
compel a public utility to sell or exchange energy when to 
do so would impair the utility's ability to render adequate 
service to its customers. 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b). SER does not 
allege that it has applied to FERC or that the other 
requirements of section 824a(b) have been satisfied. 
 
SER does not allege that it has the ability or desire to sell 
energy directly to PJM member companies other than 
PP&L. SER does not even allege that it has taken any steps 
to secure voluntary interconnection with PJM member 
companies other than PP&L. See id. § 824a(a); 18 C.F.R. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. While the Amended Complaint clearly states that SER must sell its 
energy exclusively to PP&L, the Power Purchase Agreement itself is 
ambiguous and can be read to permit SER to sell energy to third parties 
once it provides 79.5 megawatts to PP&L. Agreement, Art. 3. We rely on 
the plain language of the Amended Complaint in concluding that the 
Agreement precludes SER from competing with PP&L in the wholesale 
market. As we note in the text, however, even if the Agreement does not 
prevent SER from selling excess energy in the wholesale market: (1) SER 
may not compel other PJM member companies to accept energy directly 
from SER due to its failure to comply with 16 U.S.C.§ 824a(b); and (2) 
as a matter of undisputed fact, SER must supply its energy exclusively 
to PP&L, cannot physically provide energy directly to other utilities, and 
has not attempted to secure voluntary interconnections with PJM 
member companies other than PP&L. We will not permit SER to amend 
its Amended Complaint to clarify its rights under the Agreement as such 
amendment would be futile. 
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§ 32.1(g). Indeed, as Judge Stapleton observes, "SER has 
not alleged that it has sold, attempted to sell, or even 
intends to sell any excess capacity" to others in the 
wholesale market. Rather, SER contends that it competes 
with PP&L in the wholesale market by selling excess energy 
to PP&L and having PP&L resell the energy to other 
utilities. See Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 23, 37. As our 
rejection of SER's identical retail market argument makes 
clear, however, an arrangement whereby SER sells energy 
to PP&L and PP&L resells the energy to third parties (retail 
or wholesale) makes SER PP&L's supplier, not PP&L's 
competitor. 
 
In effect, SER's argument turns on itself. In an effort to 
demonstrate the existence of potential competition in the 
wholesale market, SER argues that it is not required to sell 
its excess energy to PP&L. SER also argues, however, that 
it competes with PP&L in the wholesale market by selling 
its excess energy to PP&L and hoping that PP&L resells that 
energy to other utilities. SER cannot have it both ways. If 
SER is not required to sell its excess energy to PP&L, SER 
cannot complain that PP&L's failure to purchase that 
energy constitutes an antitrust violation. 
 
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, we must accept 
as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them. 
Fuentes, 946 F.2d at 201. We are not, however, required to 
accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted 
inferences. Violanti v. Emery Worldwide A-CF Co., 847 F. 
Supp. 1251, 1254-55 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1993); 
Sinchak v. Parente, 262 F. Supp. 79, 81 (W.D. Pa. 1966). 
While SER alleges in its Amended Complaint that it is 
PP&L's competitor in the retail and wholesale markets, 
those assertions are belied by both the remaining factual 
allegations and the law. 
 
Finally, SER contends that PP&L's curtailment practice 
reduces the "availability to consumers of power produced 
using alternative, environmentally pro-active energy 
sources." Amended Complaint, ¶ 66. As discussed above, 
however, this allegation does not implicate the antitrust 
laws. If PP&L did hold an unlawful monopoly in its service 
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area but it decided to generate power with "environmentally 
pro-active energy sources," PP&L would satisfy SER's 
alleged concerns, but it would still hold an unlawful 
monopoly. Likewise, since we conclude that PP&L does not 
hold an unlawful monopoly in its service area, the fact that 
PP&L allegedly does not rely on "environmentally pro-active 
energy sources" does not change our conclusion about 
PP&L's generation curtailment policy. 
 
We recognize that the existence of antitrust injury is not 
typically resolved through motions to dismiss. Brader, 64 
F.3d at 876. This is not, however, a typical case. The 
fundamental dispute between SER and PP&L concerns the 
interpretation of the Power Purchasing Agreement. This 
dispute should be resolved pursuant to common-law 
contract principles and with reference to PURPA. Cf. 
Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Elec. 
Corp., 908 F. Supp. 1194, 1208 (W.D.N.Y. 1995); id. at 
1203-04 ("Although actions that violate PURPA could 
conceivably violate the antitrust laws as well, they are not 
the same thing, and one does not necessarily flow from the 
other.").16 Since both law and contract prevent SER from 
competing with PP&L, PP&L's generation curtailment policy 
cannot be said to harm competition. SER has failed to 
allege any injuries of the type the antitrust laws were 
designed to prevent, and the district court properly 
dismissed Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint. Given 
our disposition of SER's federal antitrust claims, we will 
also affirm the decision of the district court to decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over SER's state law 
claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Kamine/Besicorp involved allegations that a public utility used its 
monopsony power as the exclusive buyer of wholesale electric power 
within the utility's service area to drive a qualifying facility out of 
business by demanding a predatory price. 908 F. Supp. at 1203. The 
district court determined that the utility's monopsony power did not pose 
a threat to increased consumer prices and that the qualifying facility's 
demand for payments in excess of the utility's avoided cost was not 
supported by the antitrust laws. Id. at 1203-05. 
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V. 
 
SER also contends that the district court abused its 
discretion by not affording SER an opportunity to amend 
further its Amended Complaint. As noted above, on April 
15, 1996, the district court heard oral argument on both 
SER's motion for reconsideration of the court's stay order 
and the merits of PP&L's motion to dismiss the complaint. 
The court directed the parties to file letter briefs on these 
motions. 
 
In its April 19, 1996, letter brief, SER included two 
footnotes that suggested its desire to amend the Amended 
Complaint. SER never filed a formal motion to amend 
further its Amended Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 
Nonetheless, SER contends that its failure to file a motion 
for leave to amend should be excused and that it should be 
permitted to amend its Amended Complaint. District Council 
47, Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO 
v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1986) (amendment 
is not precluded merely because plaintiff elects to appeal 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on lack of factual specificity 
rather than seek leave to amend complaint).17 
 
Unfortunately, on appeal SER does not indicate what it 
would do with a second opportunity to amend its 
Complaint. We look, therefore, to SER's letter brief. 
Footnote 1 of the brief provides: 
 
1. SER believes that all of these inferences[regarding 
present competition with PP&L in the sale of power to 
resellers such as municipal utilities, and future 
competition in a deregulated retail market] are implicit 
in the language of its Complaint, as well as the 
suggestion that PP&L's predatory conduct will have a 
chilling effect upon the future entry into the relevant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. SER's assertion that the stay prevented SER from filing a motion for 
leave to amend the Amended Complaint is belied by the fact that (1) 
almost three months elapsed between the time PP&Lfiled its motion to 
dismiss and the time the court entered its stay order; (2) SER filed 
several letter briefs with the court during the stay; and (3) SER did not 
seek leave from the stay for permission to file a motion for leave to 
amend. Thus, we will focus on whether we should excuse SER's failure 
to seek leave to amend its Amended Complaint. 
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market of potential new electricity generation 
competitors to PP&L. Should the court decide that 
these assertions or others discussed in this letter must 
be expressly pled, SER asks the court to consider this 
letter as a request to amend the Complaint 
appropriately. 
 
SER Letter Brief, at 2 n.1 (April 19, 1996). Footnote 2 
states: 
 
2. While this fact issue could be resolved through 
discovery, SER now seeks leave to amend the 
Complaint to recite the Plant's actual capacity to 
generate at least 5.5 megawatts, for potential sale to 
third parties, in excess of the amount which it 
presently provides by contract to PP&L. 
 
Id. at 6 n.2. Thus, SER's letter brief suggests a desire to 
amend its Amended Complaint to detail allegations 
regarding (1) SER's present ability to compete with PP&L in 
the wholesale market, (2) SER's future ability to compete 
with PP&L in the retail market, and (3) PP&L's efforts to 
thwart SER's present and future competitive undertakings. 
 
If further amendment of the Amended Complaint will not 
result in a determination that the newly amended 
complaint is sufficient to withstand a renewed motion 
under Rule 12(b)(6), we need not permit the amendment. 
See Dykes v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 68 F.3d 1564, 
1572 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, #6D 6D6D# U.S. ___, 116 
S.Ct. 1434 (1996); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 
F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir. 1988). After review of SER's new 
assertions, we conclude that SER's proposed amendments 
will not enable it to withstand a renewed motion to dismiss. 
 
SER's physical ability to generate sufficient power to 
serve directly both wholesale and retail customers is not 
relevant. First, SER's Amended Complaint clearly states 
that SER is contractually bound to sell its power exclusively 
to PP&L. Second, SER concedes that at the time itfiled its 
Amended Complaint it was legally prohibited from 
competing with PP&L and that retail competition did not 
begin until pilot programs were initiated in April of 1997. 
Thus, SER could not compete with PP&L, even if it had the 
capacity to do so. We conclude that SER's proposed 
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amendments will not enable it to withstand a renewed 
motion to dismiss, and we will not grant SER leave to 
amend further its Amended Complaint.18  
 
VI. 
 
We do not decide whether PP&L's generation curtailment 
policy violates the Power Purchasing Agreement, PURPA, or 
Pennsylvania regulations. We also do not decide whether 
PP&L's practices will violate the antitrust laws in the 
future. We are limited to deciding whether SER can plead 
that, at the time the Amended Complaint was filed, PP&L 
was unlawfully monopolizing or attempting to monopolize 
the markets for the provision of electric energy to retail 
consumers or wholesale resellers. SER cannot meet this 
burden. The Power Purchasing Agreement and the law 
prevent SER from competing with PP&L in the relevant 
markets. SER cannot, therefore, plead antitrust injury. We 
will affirm the judgment of the district court. 19 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. We do not decide whether the district court should have construed 
the two footnotes as a motion for leave to amend, and we, therefore, do 
not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to 
grant such a motion. Miklavic v. USAir Inc., 21 F.3d 551, 553 (3d Cir. 
1994) (decision to dismiss with prejudice without granting leave to 
amend is subject to appellate review under abuse of discretion standard). 
It is sufficient that we find that SER is not entitled to amend its 
Amended Complaint. 
 
19. SER also argued that the district court erred in granting PP&L's 
motion for a stay of proceedings and referring the case on primary 
jurisdiction grounds to the PUC for an administrative proceeding to 
determine the regulatory propriety of PP&L's generation curtailment 
policies. See United States v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 
77 S.Ct. 161, 165 (1956) (discussing application of primary jurisdiction 
doctrine); Fulton Cogeneration Assocs. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 
84 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1996) (same). Given our disposition of the other 
issues raised in this appeal, we need not decide SER's challenge to the 
district court's stay order. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I believe that the Power Purchase Agreement between 
SER and PP&L is susceptible of an interpretation that 
SER's duty to sell exclusively to PP&L is limited to the first 
79.5 megawatts of its output. Therefore, I cannot agree with 
the majority that the "contract prevents SER from 
competing with PP&L." Maj. Op. at 12. 
 
Nonetheless, I concur in the judgment to affirm the 
district court's dismissal of SER's complaint with respect to 
the retail market on the alternative ground on which the 
majority relies: by law there was no competition in the 
retail market during the period complained of in the 
complaint. Competition in the retail market is currently 
being phased in, see Pennsylvania Electricity Generation 
Customer Choice and Competition Act, 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 2801 et seq., but there was no competition prior to 
the passage and implementation of the recent legislation. 
Without a competitive market, SER could not have been 
PP&L's competitor, and there cannot have been antitrust 
injury. 
 
I also agree that SER's complaint with respect to the 
wholesale market should be dismissed, but I reach this 
conclusion for a different reason than the majority. SER 
has not alleged that it has sold, attempted to sell, or even 
intends to sell any excess capacity (i.e. above what it 
provides under the Agreement to PP&L) on the wholesale 
market to others for resale. The proposed amendment to 
the complaint would only clarify SER's interpretation of the 
Power Purchase Agreement and allege that SER is capable 
of producing more than 79.5 megawatts. Thus, even if the 
amendment were permitted, the complaint would still be 
devoid of an allegation that SER has competed, or has even 
formulated a plan to compete, with PP&L in some 
designated wholesale market. SER's conclusory allegation 
that it is a competitor with PP&L in the wholesale market 
is entirely without factual context. Even on a motion to 
dismiss, a district court need not credit unsubstantiated 
conclusions and bald assertions. See Washington Legal 
Foundation v. Massachusetts Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 
962, 971 (1st Cir. 1993); Wright & Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1357 at 311 (1989). In the 
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absence of some description of past or anticipated 
competition between SER and PP&L in a wholesale market, 
there is no basis for inferring the existence of, or potential 
for, antitrust injury. 
 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
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